Sociolegal Analysis of Corruption Crime in Indonesia from the Perspective of Rational Choice Theory

Abstract

Corruption is a misuse of power for personal or partial gains by state officials. Corruption can cause poverty, create social inequality, or even reduce public trust toward public authorities. The question is, why do people commit corruption? Why does it continue to persist in our society? Using theoretical analysis method with the support of several existing legal norms and practices in Indonesia, this article tries to answer these questions based on the basic assumptions of rational choice theory. It assumes corruptor as a rational agent, who has the goal of maximizing personal profits, as well as awareness of the possibilities and preferences provided by the social structures to make rational choice to realize that goal (fortunes from corruption). This article will focus only on several legal preferences, in particular legally protected political rights of corruptors, and situational conditions in terms of weak liability sanctions that might be used as a basis for rational choice in corruption. The results of this study show that the rights possessed by corruption convicts contribute to rational preferences for corrupt candidates to commit acts of corruption.  In addition, this study also shows that low punishment for corruptors, low morality of prison officers, and political opportunities after release from prison are rational preferences that increase the chances of corrupt candidates committing corruption. The article therefore recommends imposing stricter liability means by revoking political rights to hold office and rights to property in order maximize suffering and to minimize benefits that are always avoided by rational agents.